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Abstract
We investigate the role of public attention in determining the effect that campaign contribu-
tions by interest groups have on legislators’ policy positions. We exploit the shock in public
attention induced by the Internet service blackout of January 2012 that increased the salience
of the SOPA/PIPA bills aimed at stronger protection of property rights on the Internet. Using
a new dataset of U.S. congressmen’s public statements, we find a strong statistical relationship
between campaign contributions funded by the affected industries and legislators’ positions.
However, this relationship evaporates once the two bills become primary policy issues. Our re-
sults are consistent with the notion that legislators choose positions on secondary policy issues
in order to cater to organized interests, whereas positions on primary policy issues are driven
by electoral support.
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Introduction
Legislative policy choices can be understood as outcomes of collective decision-making based on
individual legislators’ policy positions. Some of these positions are strongly held, others seem
rather malleable or are not revealed at all. While interest groups are affected by legislators’ po-
sitions on certain issues and therefore try to influence them, the salience of these issues for the
electorate may differ widely. Some issues receive a great deal of attention and will rouse large num-
bers of the electorate, while other issues will slip voters’ attention. These differences in salience
across policy issues create incentives for politicians who are interested in re-election. Where highly
salient primary policy issues are at stake, politicians are expected to choose a policy stance that
more closely follows voter preferences. However, where secondary policy issues are concerned,
politicians may prefer to cater to interest groups in exchange for campaign finance and therefore
support the policy options that are favored by their donors.
In this paper, we want to gain a better understanding of this trade-off and investigate how leg-
islators choose and reveal policy positions. The question is about the role of money, i.e., financial
support from interest groups, in the (non-)choice of policy positions. Specifically, we ask whether
campaign donations predict policy positions better if a policy issue is publicly less salient and
vice versa. Any empirical testing faces several challenges, however. First, there is an endogeneity
problem, as the salience of an issue is likely to depend on its content. Issues that citizens con-
sider important receive more attention, and, at the same time, legislators care more about their
constituents’ preferences. Second, there is a risk of tautological reasoning. If campaign finances
predict policy positions, one cannot conclude that the underlying issues are necessarily secondary
ones. Third, data limitations may prevent a rigorous analysis, as the researcher must simulta-
neously obtain information about the policy positions of politicians as well as about campaign
finances and the public attention given to an issue.
For the present investigation, we draw on the fluctuations in support for and opposition to the
so-called SOPA/PIPA bills in the 112th U.S. Congress as a case in point. It gives us a unique
opportunity to learn about the effect of public attention on the influence of campaign finance. The
2
Protect IP Act (S. 968; PIPA), which was introduced in the U.S. Senate on May 12, 2011, and
its counterpart, the Stop Online Piracy Act (H.R. 3261; SOPA), which was introduced in the U.S.
House on October 26, 2011, proposed extending the power of law enforcement in order to combat
online copyright infringement and online trafficking in counterfeit goods.1 Both bills were strongly
favored by the music and motion picture industries, which expected a stricter protection of their
intellectual property and thus potentially higher revenues.2 The Internet industry, on the other
hand, would face financial losses if these bills were passed. The bills offered several new ways to
penalize website providers with fines or even force them to shut down for making content available
that was free up to then. The public debate about SOPA/PIPA has, therefore, typically displayed the
legislative process behind these bills as a fight between the entertainment media/copyright industry
and the tech industry (see, e.g., Friedman 2011, Goldman 2012, and Novak 2012).
Initially, the public debate about the SOPA/PIPA bills was rather low key and involved pri-
marily people from companies in information technology. However, a drastic change occurred on
January 18, 2012, when an online protest was orchestrated involving, inter alia, Reddit and the
English-language Wikipedia. Many popular Internet sites and several thousand other smaller web-
sites participated in a temporary service blackout. This triggered a huge public debate and reflected
widespread opposition in the population.3
1See the Supplementary Information Section SI.I for a brief discussion of the two bills’ contents.
2During the weeks of the debate in the US House Judiciary Committee in December 2011, the committee published
a list of official supporters of the SOPA bill. The large majority of the organizations/corporations on that list are
representatives of the music, motion pictures, TV, and other publishing industries. Table SI1 in the Supplementary
Information links all organizations mentioned in the list to the industry codes used in campaign finance data. The
original list is still available in the Internet archive: https://web.archive.org/web/20111227040857/https:
//judiciary.house.gov/issues/Rogue%20Websites/SOPA%20Supporters.pdf.
3While the SOPA bill was immediately discussed in some well-known media outlets upon its introduction in the U.S.
House in January 2011 (see, e.g., Kang 2011), wide-scale public attention to the issue only occurred during and
after the service blackout in January 2012 (before any formal vote in Congress took place). As a direct reaction to
the service blackout, for example, over 4 million people are reported to have signed Google’s online petition to the
U.S. Congress in protest against the proposed bill and, during the peak of the protest, around 2,000 U.S. citizens per
second were trying to call their local representative in Congress (Wortham, 2012).
3
We exploit the Internet blackout in our empirical strategy, and consider the dramatic change in
attention and the outstanding success that the blackout achieved in mobilizing citizens to be unan-
ticipated by the congressmen. While the blackout was, of course, part of an opposition campaign,
few people probably expected such an action and even fewer such a leap in public attention to the
issue. The SOPA/PIPA bills thus unexpectedly changed from being a secondary policy issue to
being a primary policy issue. This allows us to study the relationship between campaign finances
and politicians’ policy positions for one and the same issue under low and high public attention.
We find that before the Internet service blackout, the probability of observing a legislator’s
public statement in support of a stricter law against online copyright infringement increases, ceteris
paribus, by around 6 percentage points if he or she received about USD 30,000 (one standard
deviation) more campaign contributions from the copyright industry than from the tech industry.
However, the significant statistical relationship between campaign contributions and the legislator’s
stated stances on the SOPA/PIPA bills evaporates almost completely after the sharp rise in public
attention on the policy issue in response to the Internet service blackout.
This study relates to several strands of research. First, and most importantly, it builds on the
substantial work on how contributions from interest groups influence legislative behavior and pub-
lic policy (see, e.g., Austen-Smith 1995, Grossman and Helpman 1994, and Kau et al. 1982 for
theoretical considerations, Herndon 1982, Powell and Grimmer 2016, Schroedel 1986, Stratmann
1991, and Stratmann 2002 for empirical evidence, as well as Ansolabehere et al. 2003 and Strat-
mann 2019 for reviews of the literature). An important lesson from this research is to consider
the conditions that moderate the influence of money from interest groups. Our emphasis is on
how attention as a contextual aspect matters. It has been argued for quite some time that political
action committees (PACs) are more successful in affecting policy choices in their favor if issue
visibility is low. For instance, Jones and Keiser (1987) and Neustadtl (1990) study whether the
partial correlation between PAC money and Members of Congress’ position on particular bills dif-
fers by visibility of the respective bills. While Jones and Keiser (1987) exclusively concentrate on
labor PACs, Neustadtl (1990) additionally considers business PACs. Both find that the correlation
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is smaller in a subset of policy issues which were covered by at least one of the major US TV-
networks and the New York Times and/or the Washington Post during the time around the vote (in
comparison to another set of policy issues that were not covered accordingly). In a similar analysis
for twenty roll-call votes between 1993 and 1996, Witko (2006) finds that PAC money is cor-
related with voting behavior for non-ideological/non-visible votes but not for ideological/visible
ones. While plausible and consistent with the theoretical reasoning, the three empirical analyses
cannot rule out that the substance of the policy issues drives both the visibility the votes get in the
media as well as the statistical relationship between campaign money and the corresponding roll
call votes. In fact, Jones and Baumgartner (2004) find in their investigation of legislature’s pol-
icy priorities that, across time, there is high congruence between the issues that the public deems
important (according to surveys) and what is debated in Congress (and probably also taken up in
the media). However, they also point out that the public’s priorities involve a rather limited set of
issues (what this study refers to as primary policy issues). Congress considers many more issues
that are not on the public’s mind (what this study refers to as secondary policy issues). These sec-
ondary issues leave room to maneuver for politicians.4 We aim at revealing this by studying how
their policy positions change once an issue switches from being secondary to being primary.
Second, and closely related to the question of how contributions from interest groups affect
legislative behavior, are the questions of why donors contribute to which campaign and how con-
tributions increase the probability of being elected. Regarding the former, theoretical models have
been developed to analyze the contributors’ rationale under different institutional settings (see, e.g.,
Aranson and Hinich 1979, Fang et al. 2016) complemented by a growing empirical literature on
the various possible motives of donors (see, e.g., Gordon et al. 2007, Bonica 2016, Barber 2016).
With regard to the latter question, a substantive number of studies have empirically investigated the
relationship between campaign contributions and election probabilities (see, e.g., Jacobson 1978,
Jacobson 1990, Gerber 1998, and recently Spenkuch and Toniatti 2018).
4This aspect is exploited in recent contributions, discussing them as a relevant factor in incumbents’ re-elections
(Bouton et al., 2018; List and Sturm, 2006).
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Third, there is a recent literature on media and politics, scrutinizing media attention as a strate-
gic factor which political agents bear in mind when they take their decisions. These studies exploit
competing news stories as exogenous variation for political news coverage. Based on this strategy,
Eisensee and Stro¨mberg (2007) analyze the relationship between natural disasters and the US gov-
ernment’s foreign aid decisions. They find that a country is more likely to receive financial support
if the disaster is covered by the US evening news. Applying a similar approach, Garz and So¨rensen
(2017) find that politicians resign with a higher probability (after their political immunity is lifted)
if their cases receive more media attention. Finally, Durante and Zhuravskaya (2018) show that
Israeli attacks on Palestinians are more likely to occur one day before a newsworthy US event takes
place. While these studies show the powerful role of traditional media, our study foreshadows that
attention effects might be even more important with a prevalence of the Internet and social media.
Finally, our contribution is more specifically related to the law, political science, and communi-
cation studies literature discussing Internet governance, public opinion and lobbying in the context
of the SOPA/PIPA bills (see Benkler et al. 2015, Guo 2013, Lemley et al. 2011, and Powell 2013).
Theoretical framework
Economic analyses of the political process have a long tradition in research that seeks to understand
which policies Members of Congress support. Closely related to this inquiry is the question about
the role that money plays in determining politicians’ choices of policy positions. In particular,
research needs to identify what factors determine the role played by campaign contributions in
affecting the stances that politicians hold on a specific issue or bill.
For the theoretical framework of this study, we define Members of Congress as being charac-
terized by their history (past policy positions, long-term exchange relationship with their sponsors)
and as being primarily office motivated. They are reliant on electoral support, which in turn de-
pends on their policy positions, as well as the campaign-financing money they have available.
Clearly, the amount of campaign finance supplied by interest groups (IG) will also depend on a
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Member of Congress’s policy position.5 Accordingly, a Member of Congress can adopt a policy
position that boosts his or her financial campaign support from IGs. Alternatively, she or he can
approve or disapprove a policy so as to gain voter support directly. The support and acclaim that a
Member of Congress receives depends on how well informed the electorate is about the Member
of Congress’s position and on how much voters care about the policy issue. Moreover, a Member
of Congress can always abstain from taking a stand in order to maintain the option to opportunisti-
cally choose a position that maximizes payoffs. Finally, a Member of Congress might also change
his or her policy position if expected payoffs can be increased. Given these considerations, we try
to characterize the main trade-off as simply as possible.
Probabilistic choice of policy positions
We minimally formalize our theoretical framework with a probabilistic choice calculus in which
legislators choose to publicly take up a stance on policy issues in order to maximize their chances
of re-election. In the simplest possible case, legislators face four options. They can announce that
they will stick to the status quo (alternative 1), they can state that they support a proposed policy
change/bill (alternative 2), they can take a neutral stance (alternative 3), or not take a public stance
at all (alternative 0). We assume that some policy issue/bill debated in Congress is one-dimensional
and affects two IGs in such a way that one favors the bill and the other opposes it. Call these IG’s
A and B. Similarly, there is a segment of voters who would be positively affected by the adoption
of the bill (voters A), while others (voters B) would lose. Legislators choose a strategy j out of
the discrete set of alternatives.6 Each of the possible stances on the issue can be more or less in
line with what the two affected IGs as well as the two groups of voters A and B favor. Importantly,
given that a conflict of interests is assumed, a position in favor of or against a policy proposal must
5The literature on campaign finance suggests that it is very difficult to empirically separate the channel running from
policy position to campaign support from that running from campaign support to the choice of policy position (see,
e.g., Bronars and Lott 1997 and Stratmann 2002).
6Note that our theoretical framework is fairly general. The same theoretical rationale can be applied in order to model
decisions in roll call votes or legislators’ public statements on any political issue.
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be in line with what one IG and one group of voters wants, but the contrary of what the other IG
and group of voters want. Hence, each substantive position j, i.e., alternatives 1 and 2, must be
closer either to IG and voter group A or to IG and voter group B.
Legislators primarily derive utility from being in office and thus maximize their utility by act-
ing in such a way that their chances of re-election are maximized. The chances of re-election
are determined directly by how close a legislator’s policy position is to that preferred by the con-
stituents and indirectly by campaign contributions from IGs, which are instrumental to electoral
success. There are thus two sources of electoral support, and legislators maximize the net support
they can gain from taking a stand either by favoring the status quo or by advocating the change
in the law relative to not committing to either substantive alternative. If support of either policy
position generates a net loss in electoral support, the legislator will not take a stand.
Suppose IG A and voter group A have policy preferences close to alternative 1. Accordingly,
alternative 2 is more attractive for IG B and voter group B. The calculus for legislator i to opt for
alternative 1, i.e., the status quo, thus depends on the expected increase in campaign support from
IG A ci1A (relative to not taking a stance) minus the expected decrease in support from IG B ci1B.
The latter may well be zero. If we assume a common multiplier that allows campaign money to be
transformed into electoral support, we obtain the first component of the net electoral support from
supporting position 1, i.e., β (ci1A−ci1B). Similarly, legislator i expects to win additional votes vi1A
from group A and to lose votes vi1B from group B. However, whether these vote gains and losses
materialize depends on the salience of the issue. Factor ρ stands for the probability that a voter
is aware of the issue (i.e., the degree of public attention). The second component thus amounts to
ρ(vi1A− vi1B). Finally, we add the opportunity costs of oi j related to making a public statement
on the issue (i.e., the time a legislator i could spend on dealing with other policy issues and win
votes). The same considerations hold for policy alternative 2 with the opposite sign. A legislator i
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can thus assess the net electoral support that positions j = 0,1,2,3 yield as
Si j = β (ci jA− ci jB)+ρ(vi jA− vi jB)−oi j j = 0,1,2,3
= β∆ci j+ρ∆vi j−oi j.
(1)
If β 6= 0 and ρ 6= 0, legislators must thus trade off the differential of the money flows from
the IG opposing the issue and the IG supporting it, and the differential in electoral support from
voters opposing and those supporting the issue, respectively. As ∆ci j and ∆vi j refer to the same
alternative j, a legislator’s decision to optimize electoral support by making a public statement
aimed at increasing ∆ci j will also affect ∆vi j. However, in the case of no public attention (ρ = 0),
the legislator’s choice of policy position is solely determined by the interests of campaign donors
who will potentially be affected by the bill (as opportunity costs of oi j are the same for making any
public statement).
From the electoral support function, we can derive a function of a legislator’s perceived re-
election chances R∗i j depending on differential money flows, voters’ position and voters’ attention
on the issue. The simplest calculus emerges in the case of a general penalty (or reward) for adopting
position j (i.e. ∆v j = constant) in the situation with full public attention (ρ = 1). In addition to
the main effect of campaign donations (in the situation with no public attention), there is a general
effect of public attention ρ∆v j summarized by the (indicator) variable pa j as well as an interaction
effect between public attention and campaign donations. The latter term captures that the strategy
has changed towards some given money flows. Hence, we can specify the impact of a legislator’s
choice of position j on his or her perceived re-election chances R∗i j as a function of ∆ci j dependent
on public attention pa j such that:
R∗i j = α j+β j∆ci j+ γ jpa j+δ jpa j∆ci j j = 0,1,2,3 (2)
where α j is a constant capturing the baseline impact of j. Given this theoretical framework, we
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can derive hypotheses about the legislator’s choices regarding his or her policy stance. Consider the
two extreme cases: (a) a secondary policy issue (pa j = 0), and (b) a highly salient policy issue, i.e.,
a primary policy issue (pa j = 1). In the first case, as stated above, a legislator’s choice of policy
position is solely determined by the interests of campaign donors who will potentially be affected
by the bill. In the latter case, the attractiveness of an alternative j also depends on the electorate’s
stance on the issue. If, for example, j were in line with the majority of voters, δ jpa j∆ci j would be
negative and would have to be more than compensated for by β∆ci j in order to make j an attractive
alternative. Hence, j would have to be a position that is clearly in line with what one of the IGs
strongly favors and is willing to reward.
Hypotheses
From the theoretical framework outlined, we derive the following two hypotheses:
H1: A legislator’s public stance on a secondary policy issue is oriented towards the position of
the affected IG to which he or she maintains the strongest exchange relationship (i.e., the more the
legislator relies on campaign contributions from the IG in question relative to other IGs).
H2: The higher the public attention/salience of an issue, the lower the impact of IGs on a legisla-
tor’s position, and the closer his or her position is to the constituents’ preferences.
Note that our hypotheses do not state that IGs have no influence on legislator’s positions under
high public attention. They simply state that such influence diminishes with increasing public
attention.
Empirical strategy
Baseline empirical model
Based on the theoretical framework, we derive our baseline empirical model in order to test the
hypotheses in the context of the SOPA/PIPA bills. First, we extend Equation 2 with a set of L
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additional variables that are potentially correlated with campaign contributions as well as R∗i j in
order to account for confounding factors that might bias the estimation of the model coefficients.
R∗i j = α j+β j∆ci j+ γ jpa j+δ jpa j∆ci j+
L
∑
l=1
θl jxil, (3)
Second, we add a random component ε j to the impact R∗i j of position j on a legislator’s per-
ceived re-election chances. A legislator i’s expected chance of re-election derived from the jth
choice is then Ri j = R∗i j + ε j. As legislators are assumed to be predominantly office-motivated,
utility maximization dictates that legislator i chooses the alternative j if Ri j > Rik ( j,k = 0,1,2,3)
for all k 6= j. By means of the random component ε j, we can then express the probability of
observing legislator i choosing position j as
P(yi = j) = P(Rik−Ri j ≤ 0, for all k 6= j)
= P(R∗i j−R∗ik ≥ εk− ε j, for all k 6= j),
(4)
and insert (3) into (4). Under the assumption of all εi j being independent and type 1 extreme
value distributed, it can be shown that this yields a multinomial logit model (MNL) of the form
pi j = P(yi = j) =
eα j+β j∆ci j+γ j pa j+δ j pa j∆ci j+∑
L
l=1 θl jxil
∑3k=0 eαk+βk∆cik+γkpak+δkpak∆cik+∑
L
l=1 θlkxil
. (5)
where pi j is the probability that legislator i chooses position j, yi is legislator i’s stated position,
β j is the baseline effect of campaign contributions (i.e., the effect if a secondary policy issue is
considered) on the probability of observing i to choose j, and δ j the differential effect of the
campaign contributions if the issue gains public attention.7
7The derivation of logit models from models of probabilistic choice goes back to Luce (1959). A general discussion
is provided by McFadden (1981) (see also Cameron and Trivedi 2005 for a complete derivation of logit from choice
models with type 1 extreme value distributed random components).
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Identification
Identifying the impact of public attention on the relevance of strong financial ties to IGs for Mem-
bers of Congress’ policy positions poses some challenges. Consider, for example, the case of a set
of bills that gain either high public attention or low public attention, and we want to test Model (5)
on the basis of roll call data or stated policy positions. It would be tricky to distinguish any effect
of public attention from the effect of the actual policy content of a bill if different policy issues
systematically gain either high or low public attention. Hence, we cannot test our hypotheses if
public attention does not vary for one and the same policy issue (or randomly across issues).
We argue that the temporary shutdown of several Internet services on January 18, 2012 in
protest against the stricter control of property rights on the Internet, as envisaged by the so-called
SOPA/PIPA bills in the United States, approximates such a setting.8 While the campaign was
certainly meant to lobby the users and was a strategic decision of the opponents of the two bills,
the action as well as the stark increase in public attention it created came as a surprise. The
overwhelming reach of the action message can thus be regarded as an unanticipated shock in
public attention for the Members of Congress. Moreover, the SOPA/PIPA bills involve highly
relevant content in terms of economic policy and Internet governance. The consequences would
have potentially affected a large number of U.S. residents. Many of them were only aware of the
SOPA/PIPA bills after the orchestrated Internet service blackout.
The vast online protest against the SOPA/PIPA bills involved Wikipedia, Google, and several
thousand smaller websites. While Wikipedia and other websites actually blacked out their services
on their web pages, Google and other websites conspicuously posted their opposition on their home
pages and motivated visitors to join the protest against SOPA/PIPA. In the case of the English-
8An alternative way to empirically separate the role of public attention from the underlying policy content might
exploit accidents and natural catastrophes as exogenous shocks to the salience of certain environmental policies.
However, such events might affect the political agenda as well as several industries in various ways. Hence, any
effect might be difficult to attribute solely to the change in public attention. In particular, such an event could shift
risk perception rather than public attention.
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language Wikipedia page, this meant that visitors were not able to search the online encyclopedia,
but were instead confronted with a banner informing visitors about potential negative consequences
of SOPA/PIPA. Figure 1 shows the Wikipedia blackout screen.
Figure 1: The English-language Wikipedia page during the service blackout on January 18, 2012
Data source: Wikipedia (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wikipedia_Blackout_
Screen.jpg)
The campaign reached many U.S. citizens within hours and generated immense resonance
on Internet portals as well as in other media.9 With the onset of the Internet service blackout,
Internet search patterns within the United States show a sharp increase in inquiries related to the
SOPA/PIPA bills. The number of queries on the terms “pipa” and “sopa” vis-a`-vis terms referring
to other well-know bills debated in the House and Senate during the same Congress is displayed in
Figure SI6 in the Supplementary Information. The figure indicates that SOPA/PIPA-related search
interest not only peaked during the time of the Internet service blackout, but was also very low
during 2011 when the respective bills were being discussed in Congress. As to the search volume
9According to Wikipedia about 160 million people saw their protest message that day, not counting the visitors to
other protesting sites (Waugh and Poulter, 2012). Benkler et al. (2015) report massive online mobilization following
the days of the blackout, reflected in over 3000 news stories surrounding the SOPA/PIPA bills and emerging during
the week of the blackout.
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related to SOPA, none of the terms related to other major bills show similar magnitude (such as
“Obamacare”) of search volume at any point during the 112th U.S. Congress.
As a direct consequence of the orchestrated service blackout, according to some estimates,
about 2,000 phone calls per second were attempted by U.S. citizens during the peak of the protest,
who were trying to contact their local representative in Washington D.C. (Wortham, 2012). In
addition, over 400,000 Emails were sent in protest against the bills (FFTF, 2012). Over 4 million
people signed Google’s online petition to the U.S. Congress in protest against the proposed bills
as a direct reaction to the Internet blackout (Wortham, 2012). Moreover, 10 million people are
reported to have signed petitions against SOPA organized by Free Press, Don’t Censor the Net,
Avaaz, Credo, and MoveOn (FFTF, 2012). Overall, the reactions clearly reflected the opposition
of large parts of the citizenry to the two bills.
Data
We compile and code a dataset with Members of Congress’ recorded public statements on the
SOPA/PIPA bills. We link the Members of Congress’ statements with data on their political back-
ground (years in office and party affiliation), their personal background (gender and age), as well
as detailed micro-data on specific campaign contributions received by them. The following sub-
sections introduce the various data sources and explain the coding of the main variables.
Public statements on the SOPA/PIPA bills
The dataset covers the political debate from September 2010, i.e., the introduction of a preliminary
version of the PIPA bill to the U.S. Senate, to the end of February 2012, i.e., a few weeks after
the postponement of the SOPA and the PIPA bills in January 2012. The data compilation and
coding is conducted in five steps. First, we assemble a baseline sample of recorded statements
from two independent secondary data sources which collected statements on SOPA/PIPA during
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the debate: ProPublica10 and The Sunlight Foundation’s OpenCongress11.12 Second, given the
baseline dataset of recorded statements, we remove overlapping records. Third, we assign each
of the statements to one of three categories (in a first step ignoring the categorization provided by
ProPublica and OpenCongress):
1. The legislator stated s/he was in favor of the bill.
2. The legislator stated s/he was against the bill.
3. The legislator stated s/he was undecided.
Fourth, we compare our coding to the categorization provided by the secondary data sources (ProP-
ublica and OpenCongress) and carefully reconsider all divergent cases. The categorization by
ProPublica diverges in 70 cases, as this organization uses an additional category: “leaning no”.
In our coding, these statements are coded as either “undecided”, or “against”, respectively.13 Fi-
nally, for all legislators where no recorded statement was available before and/or after the service
blackout, we added an entry “no opinion recorded”. Thus, we end up with a dataset in which each
member serving in the 112th Congress is assigned at least one entry before the service blackout
and one entry after the service blackout. Our data preparation procedure thus generates a balanced
panel consisting of all Members of Congress (except for Delegates and one vacant seat in the U.S.
House).14
10ProPublica is an independent, non-profit news outlet that specializes in investigative journalism (see http://www.
propublica.org/about/)
11The Sunlight Foundation is a non-partisan, non-profit organization that promotes open government by pro-
viding data on various aspects of local, state, and federal U.S. politics via several web services (http://
sunlightfoundation.com/about). Its OpenCongress web platform (www.opencongress.org) provides de-
tailed information on the legislative process in the U.S. Congress.
12See Section SI.II in the Supplementary Information for a detailed description of the data gathering and data prepa-
ration process.
13Of the remaining statements, we encountered 41 divergent cases. Table SI2 in the Supplementary Information
presents an overview of all coding differences.
14In total, the panel includes 534 Members of Congress and 502 individual statements in favor of or against the bills
and 96 entries for “undecided”. The difference to the official number of 535 voting members in the U.S. Congress
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Table 1 provides an overview of the number of statements assigned to each category before and
after the service blackout, as well as the respective count of legislators involved. The table shows
that the total number of recorded statements is rather balanced across the two periods before and
after the Internet blackout. It also becomes apparent that the majority of public statements in favor
of the SOPA/PIPA bills were made before the service blackout, whereas the majority of statements
against the bills were made afterwards.
Table 1: Count of legislators and statements on SOPA/PIPA before and after the Internet service blackout
Before After
Public statements in favor 163 6
(No. of legislators involved) (82) (6)
- final stated stance 69 3
Public statements against 93 240
(No. of legislators involved) (51) (208)
- final stated stance 48 205
Public statements undecided 45 51
(No. of legislators involved) (39) (45)
- final stated stance 30 43
No. of legislators making no public statements 387 283
Total no. of recorded statements 301 297
Total no. of legislators 534 534
Notes: Of the 69 Members of Congress who made a public statement in favor, 21 changed their position to
against. Of all the Members of Congress making public statements about their position on SOPA/PIPA, 60
made more than one statement before the Internet service blackout and 41 made more than one statement
after the blackout. Tables SI3 and SI4 in the Supplementary Information show a detailed account of the
number of statements by each Member of Congress in our sample (before and after the Internet service
blackout).
Data sources: See Section SI.III in the Supplementary Information.
The timing of the public statements in the SOPA/PIPA debate is illustrated in Figure 2. The
is explained by a temporarily vacant seat in the 112th U.S. House. Representative David Wu (Democrat, Oregon)
resigned in August 2011. His seat was later taken by Suzanne Bonamici, who joined the U.S. House in February
2012 (see the official list of vacancies and successors of the 112th U.S. Congress under http://history.house.
gov/Institution/Vacancies-Successors/112/). Thus, neither Representative was in office throughout the
SOPA/PIPA debate and particularly not during the Internet service blackout and are therefore excluded from the
analysis.
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statements are rather broadly spread over the period when the SOPA/PIPA bills were barely pub-
licly discussed. However, when the issue suddenly received much greater public attention in re-
sponse to the Internet service blackout, the number of public statements (mostly against SOPA/PIPA)
increased sharply. Figure 2 indicates clearly how effective the sudden public attention was in oblig-
ing legislators to communicate their position on the issue.
Figure 2: Number of stated stances of Members of the U.S. Congress on the SOPA/PIPA bills over time
Internet service blackout
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Notes: The time frame includes all observations in our sample (from the introduction of the COICA bill to
the postponement of SOPA/PIPA.) The black dashed vertical line indicates the Internet service blackout on
January 18, 2012.
Data sources: Own compilation based on various sources. See Section SI.III in the Supplementary Infor-
mation for details.
In addition, Figure SI1 in the Supplementary Information shows the count of Members of
Congress’ taking either position before and after the Internet blackout. When the exact counts are
examined, the pattern revealed shows that many of them actually changed their position. Remark-
ably, several Members of Congress switched with regard to their stance on Internet governance
from supporting the SOPA bill to opposing it (or at least ceasing to support it). None of them
switched sides in the other direction.
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Campaign contributions
Finance data on campaign contributions come from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) and
were collected via the Sunlight Foundation’s Influence Explorer database.15 All campaign contri-
bution records indicate the industry with which the respective contributor is affiliated. We focus on
contributions from two main industry categories: “TV/MOVIES/MUSIC” for the copyright indus-
try and “COMPUTERS/INTERNET” for the tech industry. Contributions by these two industries
are very similar in terms of magnitude and follow similar patterns over time. The monthly average
total campaign contributions to Members of Congress by either of these two industries is around
one million USD (see Figure SI2 in the Supplementary Information for details). The two industries
thus seem to be similarly engaged in donating money to members of the U.S. Congress.
For our main analyses, we compute the total amount of campaign contributions donated by
each of the two industries to each legislator over the year before the Internet service blackout. Our
main explanatory variable, in line with our theoretical considerations, is the difference between
these two sums (∆ci j ≡ ∆Contributions (USD 1,000), i.e., the total campaign contributions by the
copyright industry minus total campaign contributions by the tech industry in USD 1,000).
Legislators’ political and personal background
Some individual characteristics of the Members of Congress in the sample serve as control vari-
ables. Data on the political and personal background of legislators are derived from the Library
of Congress. These characteristics include the number of years served in Congress (Years served),
party affiliation (an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the legislator is Republican, and equal to
0 otherwise), Age, and gender (an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the legislator is Male). In
addition, our pooled data set (combining stances on SOPA and PIPA) contains an indicator variable
that is equal to 1 for Senators (PIPA) and 0 for Representatives (SOPA). Table SI6 in the Supple-
15The full raw dataset is available under https://sunlightlabs.github.io/datacommons/bulk_data.html.
Specific parts of the database can be queried via the Influence Explorer API (https://sunlightlabs.github.
io/datacommons/).
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mentary Information shows some descriptive statistics for the variable campaign contributions as
well as the legislators’ characteristics. The biggest surplus in contributions from the copyright
industry amounts to USD 275,000 in the year prior to the blackout. The corresponding amount for
the tech industry amounts to USD 429,000. On average, the difference is about USD 3,600. In all,
54% of the Members of Congress were Republicans. The mean age is 58 years. They have served,
on average, about 12 years. The proportion of men is 83%.
Results
We present the results of our empirical analyses in three steps. First, we document the statistical
relationship between campaign contributions and legislators’ stances on SOPA/PIPA. Second, we
test our two main hypotheses with estimates of the multinomial logit model (5). Third, we briefly
discuss the results of various robustness checks.
Statistical relationship between campaign finance and policy positions
Our descriptive analyses document the statistical relationship between campaign contributions
from the tech industry and the copyright industry, and the Members of Congress’ publicly stated
opinions on the issue. Figure 3 presents the aggregate surplus of copyright-industry campaign con-
tributions (copyright minus tech contributions) per month over the period from one year before the
service blackout to one year after the service blackout. One time series is plotted for legislators
whose last stance before the service blackout was in favor of SOPA/PIPA and one is for those
whose last stance before the service blackout was against SOPA/PIPA. Strikingly, the supporters
of the bills receive systematically more campaign contributions from the copyright industry than
from the tech industry (mean difference t-value: -10.533).16 This is particularly the case for the
16Figures SI3 and SI5 in the Supplementary Information further illustrate this point. Particularly, Figure SI5 shows
that both sponsors and cosponsors of SOPA/PIPA received substantially more campaign finance money from the
copyright industry than from the tech industry.
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time before the Internet service blackout.
Figure 3: Campaign finance contributions to supporters and opponents of SOPA/PIPA
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Notes: Monthly differences between the total contributions by the copyright industry and the tech industry
over the period of one year before the Internet service blackout until one year after the Internet service
blackout. One time series is plotted for those Members of Congress who publicly stated they were in favor
of the SOPA/PIPA bills before the service blackout and one for those who publicly indicated their opposition
before the service blackout.
Data sources: Center for Responsive Politics/OpenSecrets.org, Sunlight Foundation, and ProPublica (see
Section ‘Data’ and Section SI.III in the Supplementary Information for details).
Based on a simple linear regression analysis, we further study the correlation between cam-
paign contributions from the two primarily affected industries and legislators’ positions. In par-
ticular, we estimate the probability of observing a statement in favor of SOPA/PIPA (vs. against,
undecided or no statement) before the service blackout as well as the probability of observing a
statement against SOPA/PIPA (vs. in favor, undecided or no statement) before the service black-
out as a function of the campaign contributions a legislator received and additional factors, most
importantly his or her party affiliation. While we pool the data from both chambers, we include
an indicator variable for Senators to control for differences between the two chambers (as well as
potentially relevant differences between SOPA and PIPA).17 Table 2 presents the results.
17In addition, we also estimate the simple linear regression model separately for the House and the Senate. The results
are qualitatively the same and can be provided on request.
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Table 2: OLS estimates of stated stances on SOPA/PIPA before the Internet service blackout
Dependent variable:
Stance in favor of SOPA/PIPA = 1 Stance against SOPA/PIPA = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Contributions (USD 1,000) 0.003 0.002 0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Republican −0.024 −0.038 −0.047 −0.033
(0.029) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025)
Male −0.012 0.006 −0.025 −0.009
(0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Age 0.002 0.001 −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Years served −0.002 −0.0003 0.001 0.0004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Senator (PIPA) 0.289 0.317 0.079 0.103
(0.049) (0.045) (0.038) (0.040)
Constant 0.120 0.003 −0.266 0.097 0.249 0.084
(0.014) (0.088) (0.118) (0.013) (0.087) (0.094)
State fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 534 534 534 534 534 534
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.173 0.218 0.051 0.062 0.076
Residual Std. Error 0.326 0.305 0.297 0.279 0.277 0.275
F Statistic 32.150 19.643 3.699 29.448 6.827 1.794
Notes: The difference in contributions is computed by subtracting the total amount of contributions a Mem-
ber of Congress received from the tech industry over a period of one year prior to the Internet service
blackout from the total amount received from the copyright industry over the same time period. The depen-
dent variable considers the last opinion recorded before the Internet service blackout. The reference group
includes Members of Congress who had an opposite stance, were indifferent, or did not make any public
statement before the Internet service blackout. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses.
Data sources: See Section ‘Data’ Section SI.III in the Supplementary Information for details.
The estimated partial correlations show that the previously illustrated relationship between
specific campaign contributions and legislators’ stances on SOPA/PIPA - when there was limited
attention on the issue - hold, ceteris paribus. The coefficient of the difference in contributions in
specification (2) indicates that an increase of one standard deviation (around USD 30,000) in the
surplus of contributions received from the copyright industry increases the probability of observing
a legislator making statements in favor of SOPA/PIPA by around 6 percentage points (31.286×
0.002× 100). The opposite holds for statements against SOPA/PIPA in column (5). In columns
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(3) and (6), we additionally control for state-fixed effects. These specifications thus take into
account unobserved factors, such as industry structure, that might be correlated both with campaign
contributions from specific industries as well as with specific preferences for policies on Internet
governance. The findings hold.
Hypotheses tests
We test our hypotheses by estimating Model (5) with our panel data set containing an observation
for each Member of Congress before and after the Internet blackout. Coefficients of interaction
terms are generally difficult to interpret in the case of non-linear regression models and the t-
tests of individual coefficients are not sufficient to test the hypotheses for interaction effects. We
therefore compute discrete effects for typical observations.18 Based on the estimated coefficients,
we predict that probabilities for choosing either alternative are dependent on different levels of the
campaign contribution differential, while keeping all other covariates fixed at typical values.19 In
order not to overstate the computed effects, we only present effects based on the actual range of
campaign contributions observed in our data set.
Table 3 shows the results from our baseline multinomial logit (MNL) model. The coefficients
of the covariates regressed on the alternative “no opinion recorded” are normalized to 0 and are
not presented in the table. The results can thus be interpreted relative to this reference category.
The first specification (columns 1 to 3) only includes the variables capturing campaign finances.
Columns 4 to 6 show the results of our preferred specification derived from our theoretical frame-
work including the Senator-indicator and further control variables.
For both specifications, the results indicate that before the service blackout, the probability of
observing a statement in favor of SOPA/PIPA is higher than not observing one, the more money
a legislator received from the copyright industry. The opposite is the case for statements against
18The effects (and their respective confidence intervals) are computed with the method suggested by Fox and Hong
(2009).
19Continuous variables are fixed at their sample means and binary or ordinal variables at their proportional distribution
in the sample.
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Table 3: MNL estimates of stated stances on SOPA/PIPA before/after the Internet service blackout
Dependent variable:
Undecided Against In favor Undecided Against In favor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Contributions (USD 1,000) 0.006 −0.038 0.028 0.006 −0.039 0.022
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
After 0.699 1.871 −2.633 0.583 1.886 −2.764
(0.279) (0.178) (0.300) (0.281) (0.183) (0.321)
∆ Contributions (USD 1,000) x after −0.008 0.039 −0.019 −0.010 0.038 −0.019
(0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010)
Republican 0.175 −0.170 −0.320
(0.297) (0.195) (0.334)
Male −0.762 0.100 −0.132
(0.373) (0.248) (0.414)
Age 0.031 −0.016 0.018
(0.018) (0.012) (0.020)
Years served 0.009 −0.010 −0.014
(0.019) (0.013) (0.022)
Senator (PIPA) 2.128 0.960 2.417
(0.387) (0.260) (0.464)
Constant −2.580 −2.198 −1.985 −4.599 −1.308 −3.220
(0.197) (0.126) (0.213) (1.013) (0.649) (1.112)
N 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,897.123 1,897.123 1,897.123 1,773.751 1,773.751 1,773.751
Notes: The difference in contributions is computed by subtracting the total amount of contributions that a
legislator received from the tech industry over a period of one year prior to the Internet service blackout from
the total amount received from the copyright industry over the same period of time. The sample contains two
observations per member of Congress, i.e., the last recorded opinions before and after the Internet service
blackout. The alternative ‘no opinion recorded’ serves as the reference category (the respective coefficients
are normalized to 0, and are not shown in the table). Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Data sources: Own compilation from various sources. See Section ‘Data’ and Section SI.III in the Supple-
mentary Information for details.
SOPA/PIPA, which are less likely to be observed before the blackout from legislators who received
more from the copyright industry. The probability of observing neutral statements on SOPA/PIPA
before the Internet service blackout is not statistically significantly related to the difference in
campaign contributions from the two affected industries. These findings are in line with Hypothesis
1, which posits that policy positions on secondary policy issues are ceteris paribus at least partly
driven by financial ties with IGs. The sudden increase in public attention due to the service blackout
has (if neither of the two industries contributes substantially more) a strong positive effect on the
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likelihood of observing more neutral statements as well as more statements against SOPA/PIPA,
but a negative effect on the likelihood of observing statements in favor of SOPA/PIPA (see the
second row of estimated coefficients). Overall, there is therefore a move in legislators’ positions
towards the position expressed by many constituents once salience rises.
Figure 4 presents effect plots (taking into account the interaction term in the second specifi-
cation of Table 3; see Fox and Hong 2009 for details on the computation of effect plots based on
MNL models) that quantify the economic significance of the shock in public attention on the role
of campaign finance contributions in politicians’ stances. It illustrates the ceteris paribus effect
of the difference in campaign contributions from the two affected industries on the probability of
observing a legislator choosing any of the four alternatives. The plots on the left-hand side show
this relationship for the time before the service blackout, and the ones on the right-hand side for
the time after.
The plotted effects present a rather clear picture with respect to the role of campaign contri-
butions in motivating politicians to take a stance on SOPA/PIPA. In line with the simpler OLS
models presented above, the probability of observing a politician publicly supporting SOPA/PIPA
is ceteris paribus systematically higher, if he or she received more campaign contributions from
the copyright industry than from the tech industry, and vice versa. However, this strong statistical
relationship almost completely disappears once SOPA/PIPA becomes a primary policy issue due to
the stark increase in public attention. In the context of the SOPA/PIPA bills, the empirical finding
is thus consistent with Hypothesis 2, which posits that the influence that financial ties to IGs have
on legislators’ positions on a policy issue decreases with increasing public attention to the issue.
The results presented are robust if the sample is restricted to the legislators who made a public
statement before the Internet service blackout.20
20The additional results are available on request.
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Figure 4: Campaign contributions and publicly stated stances before and after the Internet blackout
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Notes: Effect plots based on the estimated multinomial logit model with the interaction term
∆ Contributions (USD 1,000)× after presented in Table 3, columns 4 to 6. The y-axis depicts the esti-
mated probability of observing a legislator to take one of the alternative positions on the SOPA/PIPA bills.
The dashed lines display a 95-percent confidence interval around the estimated effects.
Data sources: See Section ‘Data’ and Section SI.III in the Supplementary Information for details.
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Robustness Checks
We check the robustness of our empirical findings with five supplementary analyses (see Sec-
tion SI.VI in the Supplementary Information for a thorough discussion of these analyses). First,
we additionally control for the industry structure in electoral districts. Second, in order to allow
for a more flexible specification, we estimate our model once for the period before the Internet
service blackout and once for the period after the Internet service blackout. This addresses the
potential issue that the internet blackout might have changed the role of unobserved factors that
might be correlated with our covariates. Third, we also re-estimate our baseline MNL by includ-
ing the gross campaign donations of both industries instead of the difference between the two.
Fourth, we estimate our baseline MNL separately for the Senate (PIPA) and the House (SOPA).
Finally, we re-estimate our baseline MNL as a nested MNL in order to relax the independence of
irrelevant-alternatives assumption (implied by standard MNLs). None of these robustness checks
qualitatively changes the main findings presented here.
Concluding remarks
Technological change challenges established industries. Old and new players pursue strategies
beyond markets and lobby legislatures for a favorable legal environment. Sometimes these fac-
tional arguments are supported by financial contributions that help legislators fund their electoral
campaigns. In this context, it is still not well understood what factors induce legislators to support
specific IG interests. In our paper, we emphasize public attention to a policy issue as a crucial
condition affecting whether legislators cater more to IGs or to their constituency. We present a
simple calculus for the relationship between the campaign contributions that a legislator receives
from a specific IG and his or her support of a specific policy issue favoring that IG. A stronger
positive (statistical) relationship is predicted if the issue in question is not a salient topic of public
interest than if it is.
Our empirical analysis takes up the regulation of an area that is the epitome of change and has
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potentially far-reaching consequences for many citizens, i.e., the regulation of the Internet. In this
area, the protection of copyright is one specific aspect with conflicting interests within different
industries as well as between some industries and consumers (see, e.g., Lessig 2004). A case in
point are two bills introduced in the U.S. Congress in 2011: the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and
the Protect IP Act (PIPA). They aim at strengthening law enforcement to combat online copyright
infringements and online trafficking in counterfeit goods. Based on our compiled dataset, we are
able to trace the policy stance of legislators on the issue over time. The results of our multinomial
logit regressions reveal that the surplus in financial support from the copyright industry (relative
to contributions from the tech industry) predicts the stance that legislators adopt on the two bills
up to January 18, 2012. This is the date when roughly 7,000 web platforms in the United States
(including Wikipedia and Google) temporarily shut down their sites to protest against the two bills.
The event substantially increased public attention on this issue and thus fueled the dynamic of the
political discourse. On average, legislators after the event were more likely to oppose the bills and
less likely to publicly support them. More interestingly and in line with our hypothesis, campaign
contributions from the industries involved no longer have predictive power for legislators’ stances
on the issue.
Besides serving as an interesting case in point to test our hypothesis, the Internet service black-
out also points to a strategy that some interest groups might use when pursuing their goals. This
has previously been discussed by Schattschneider (1960) as an expansion of the scope of conflict
involving the public.21 The coordinated action can be understood as lobbying by rousing grass-
roots. The actors aim to increase the salience of an issue within the electorate in order to motivate
legislators to take potential voter reactions into account. In such a setting, the question of what are
primary policy issues is endogenous and might change between the introduction of a bill and the
final decision on it in the legislature. As recognized in the literature on campaigning, it is difficult
21Related work refers to lobbying citizens and outside lobbying (see, e.g., Kollman 1998, Mahoney 2007, and Wolton
2018). In the particular context of this study, the success of outside lobbying might well depend on how civic
engagement is related to Internet usage more generally (see, e.g., Jennings and Zeitner 2003).
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to steer the salience that an issue will have with the public. In fact, the salience of policy issues
might be understood as resulting from shocks triggered by some random events and hyped by the
media (and other self-interested actors). As an optimal decision rule, lobbying by rousing grass-
roots is unlikely to be a commonly chosen option (as opposed to lobbying legislators). It is likely
to be chosen by IGs who control (part of) the media (and the Internet), and for concerns that are
secondary policy issues and have the potential to become primary policy issues for retrospective
voters. There is still a lot to be learned about exchange in the political sphere.
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